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may create an environment where the measures allegedly 
taken with reference to the protection of workers primarily 
seek to prevent undertakings from lawfully establishing 
themselves in other EEA States”.61 In the case at hand it 
appeared that the boycott could even be detrimental to the 
situation of Holship’s employees.62 
IV. Conclusions
Paul Mahoney’s statement, referred to at the beginning of 
my contribution, continues: “The journey made by human 
rights down the short road from Strasbourg to Luxembourg, 
together with the warm welcome they received there from 
the Luxembourg judges, is a fascinating story ... [H]uman 
rights took up residence in Luxembourg under the head 
of ‘fundamental rights of the European Communities’ 
and found themselves a second home on the European 
judicial level, not their main European judicial residence 
perhaps but a well-used secondary residence.”63 Mutatis 
mutandis, this also applies to the interpretation of the EEA 
Agreement by the EFTA Court. The latter has not shied 
away from tackling areas of debate. And it has on essential 
issues given more weight to Strasbourg case-law than to the 
case-law of its Luxembourg sister court. It is thus all the 
more important that the dialogue between the EFTA Court 
and the European Court of Human Rights should not be a 
one-way street. In Ališić and Others the Strasbourg Court 
referred to the EFTA Court’s Icesave judgment.64
Finally, while it is the Luxembourg Courts which are 
primarily engaged in the supervision of EU and EEA law,65  
the partial blurring of dividing lines between Strasbourg 
and Luxembourg has proven to have benefi ted, in 
particular, those who create wealth in the European Single 
Market – in the EFTA Court’s words, the market actors.66 
At the very least, fundamental rights provide a guiding line 
as to the fairness of market-access rules. This merits being 
borne in mind during the recasting of the relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union 
after Brexit.
61  Ibid., para. 125.
62  Ibid., para. 126.
63  Paul Mahoney (supra note 1), p. 73.
64  EurCourtHR, Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, no. 60642/08, judgment of 16 July 2014, paras. 70 et seq.; 
referring to E-16/11, EFTA Surveillance Authority v. Iceland, [2013] 
EFTA Ct. Rep. 4.
65  See Alan Rosas (supra note 4), p. 167.
66  Deveci (supra note 18), para. 64.
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I. Introduction
The British Conservative Party, currently in government, 
has declared its intention to establish a national Bill of 
Rights at the same time as repealing the Human Rights 
Act 1998 that incorporates the European Convention on 
Human Rights into domestic law. Its one short paragraph 
on the matter in its policy programme delivered in the 
Queen’s Speech to Parliament on 18 May 2016 was 
expressed in the following terms: 
“My government will hold a referendum on membership 
of the European Union. Proposals will be brought 
forward for a British Bill of Rights. My ministers will 
uphold the sovereignty of Parliament and the primacy of 
the House of Commons.”1 
This typifi es the confl ation that has emerged in recent 
times of the idea of a British Bill of Rights with attitudes 
towards Europe generally, and with ambiguous concepts 
about national or parliamentary sovereignty in particular. 
This article analyses the government’s proposal2 for a 
British Bill of Rights in its historical and political context. 
It provides a study of the reasoning and pressures behind 
the idea of a Bill of Rights as they have evolved, developed, 
and changed over the past fi fty years. The signifi cance of 
the Bill of Rights debate is discussed for what it reveals 
about Britain’s political and constitutional affairs more 
widely. In a fi nal section, the conclusions and views of the 
author are given on how the proposed British Bill of Rights 
is best conceived, formulated and designed for today and 
the future.
II. Incorporation of the ECHR and a Bill of Rights
Much of the controversy surrounding, and antagonism 
towards, the Human Rights Act in British public discourse 
has been driven simply by perceptions of it being a 
European-inspired instrument (even though the articles 
of the Convention were principally drafted by UK offi cials 
in 1949-503) and resentment at foreign interference in the 
* Robert Blackburn, QC, LLD; Professor of Constitutional 
Law, King’s College London; UK National Correspondent to 
the Council of Europe, Directorate of Human Rights, 1983-2008. 
The present text is a written contribution to the Colloquy held in 
honour of Paul Mahoney in September 2016 in the Human Rights 
Building in Strasbourg, see above at p. 241.
1 Lords Hansard, 18 May 2016, cols. 3-4; see also 27 May 2015, 
cols. 5-7. On the government’s plans to repeal the Human Rights 
Act as part of its enactment of a Bill of Rights see section IX below. 
The referendum referred to was subsequently held on 23 June 2016 
and resulted in a 52:48 % decision to leave the EU.
2 At the time of writing, September 2016, no draft legislation on 
the proposal had been prepared and presented to Parliament.
3 On the drafting of the ECHR see Robert Blackburn and Jörg 
Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental Rights in Europe: The ECHR and 
its Member States 1950-2000 (2001), esp. pp. 936-946.
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UK’s domestic affairs. This attitude of mind, commonly 
referred to in political discourse as “Euro-scepticism” or 
“Euro-phobia”, has been a deeply divisive force in British 
politics, cutting across all parties at various times since 
1972,4 and culminated in the shock of the referendum 
result to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016. 
It was a strategic mistake of the Labour government 
entering offi ce in 1997 to abandon the party’s earlier 
programme of constitutional reform prepared under the 
leadership of John Smith in 1992-94 and to confuse the 
idea of a British Bill of Rights with incorporation of the 
ECHR. The party’s 1993 document entitled A New Agenda 
for Democracy had well-advisedly set out a two-stage 
process of human rights reform, being to incorporate (give 
formal legal recognition of) the ECHR in domestic law, 
and then proceed to enact a homegrown Bill of Rights. 
This was to be approached in a comprehensive, joined-up 
manner, pointing in the direction of the longer-term aim of 
a written UK constitution, one in which the Bill of Rights 
already on the statute book would fi nd a natural home as 
forming part of the fundamental law of the state. Instead, 
the Blair administration chose to adopt an ad hoc approach 
to political and constitutional reform, confused the two 
concepts of ECHR incorporation and a Bill of Rights, and 
dropped its earlier pledge on a Bill of Rights.5
Incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law (which 
is not a specifi c requirement of the Convention6) is not 
the same thing as a constitutional Bill of Rights: they are 
essentially separate and distinct concepts, both legally 
and politically. The incorporation of principles contained 
in an international treaty to which a state has become a 
signatory is common elsewhere, and is automatic on the 
ratification of a treaty under the constitutional law of most 
other European states.7 Treaties, as incorporated, allow for 
explicit judicial recognition of international obligations 
in domestic law, and disputes as to the meaning of those 
obligations may be subject to a right to appeal to an 
international court, such as the Court of Human Rights at 
Strasbourg under the terms of the ECHR. A country’s Bill 
of Rights, by contrast, is drafted specifically and exclusively 
for internal application within a country’s constitutional 
system, usually forming a body of fundamental law within 
the state, and there is no external judicial appeal on the 
meaning of its provisions. Such a document sets out the 
rights and freedoms of its citizens, attuned to the indigenous 
culture of its particular society. A national Bill of Rights 
raises the question of the balance of power between the 
three branches of state, executive, legislature and judiciary, 
and such a document usually possesses a special status 
and priority in law over other legal measures, as well as a 
special parliamentary process for changing its content and 
details. 
This distinction is of a great importance. Because the 
Labour government treated incorporation of the ECHR 
and the Human Rights Act as though it were a Bill of 
Rights, it fell into the fatal political trap of associating it 
with Europe and the idea that a foreign European court 
was dictating to Parliament and the British people what 
their rights and freedoms are and should be. The better 
approach would have been to incorporate the ECHR as 
an interpretative document only,8 leaving the issues and 
formulation of actionable rights in the courts, and their 
status and priority in law, to the separate enactment 
of a domestic British Bill of Rights conducted shortly 
afterwards.
III. British Constitutionalism
For over half a century, heated debates in Britain have 
been held in Parliament, within the political parties, and 
at our Universities, on the desirability or otherwise of a 
Bill of Rights. A characteristic of much of the debate has 
been its domination by lawyers, and much of what follows 
in this article considers these in some detail. But there are 
good social and political arguments for a Bill of Rights, 
particularly for their educative value and as points of 
reference in terms of political accountability. As Harold 
Laski once said, 
“There is a real value in Bills of Rights which it is both 
easy, and mistaken, to underestimate. Granted that the 
people are educated to the appreciation of their purpose, 
they serve to draw attention, as attention needs to be 
drawn, to the fact that vigilance is essential in the realm 
of what Cromwell called fundamentals. Bills of Rights 
are, quite undoubtedly, a check upon possible excess in 
the government of the day.”9
Fundamental to understanding the Bill of Rights debate 
in Britain is to appreciate the distinctive elements of British 
constitutionalism, in particular its unwritten (meaning un-
codifi ed) nature, its dogma of parliamentary sovereignty 
(meaning the legal supremacy of an Act of Parliament), 
and its partial acceptance of the doctrine of separation of 
powers (with a fused executive-legislature and independent 
but subordinate judiciary). These elements were established 
as the outcome of the constitutional confl icts of the 
seventeenth century, leaving the Crown and Parliament as 
the axis of the constitution down to the present day. It is also 
important to appreciate that the three legal systems10 of the 
United Kingdom have a dualist approach to international 
law, one that is fi rmly buttressed by those championing the 
sovereignty of the British Parliament. 
The English document known as The Bill of Rights 1688, 
parts of which are still on the statute book, is not, and 
never was, a charter of individual and minority rights and 
freedoms in the modern democratic sense. It formed part 
of the constitutional settlement under which William and 
Mary assumed the Throne after the enforced abdication 
of King James II, proclaiming the legal and constitutional 
primacy of an Act of Parliament over all matters in the 
state including the ancient common law prerogative 
powers of the Crown. The parliamentarians and common 
lawyers of the day re-invented and invoked Magna Carta 
from medieval times to suit their ideological claims for 
limited government and freedom from arbitrary rule. 
When two centuries later the infl uential Victorian jurist A. 
V. Dicey came to write the section on civil liberties in his 
book on The Law of the Constitution, formulated largely in 
response to constitutional developments in America and 
France, he expressed these British concepts through the 
terminology of “the rule of law”. 
“The ‘rule of law’... may be used as a formula for 
expressing the fact that with us the law of the constitution, 
the rules which in foreign countries naturally form 
part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the 
4 On divisions within both Labour and Conservative parties on 
Europe, see Vernon Bogdanor, “Learning from History: The 1975 
Referendum on Europe”, Gresham College Lecture, 23 May 2016.
5 See further below at pp. 315-316.
6 See for example Observer and Guardian v. United Kingdom 
(26 November 1991, 13 HRLJ 7 (1992)); and for discussion, Robert 
Blackburn and Jörg Polakiewicz, Fundamental Rights, supra note 3, 
chapter 2 especially pp. 31-33.
7 This is not the case in the UK with its dualist approach to 
the legal status of treaties, so that an Act of the UK Parliament is 
required to give their domestic legal effect: see Robert Blackburn 
and Jörg Polakiewicz, Fundamental Rights, supra note 3.
8 This would strengthen the status of the Convention as 
a persuasive authority in the interpretation of uncertain or 
ambiguous provisions or principles in statute and common law, 
including in judicial review proceedings.
9 Liberty in the Modern State (1937), p. 76.
10  i.e. England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.
2016] THE IDEA OF A BRITISH BILL OF RIGHTS 313
consequence of the rights of individuals, as defi ned and 
enforced by the courts... There is in the English constitution 
an absence of those declarations or defi nitions of rights 
so dear to foreign constitutionalists.”11
It was these ideas, especially absence of arbitrary 
authority and equality before the law, that were said to 
underpin and guarantee an English citizen’s rights and 
freedoms; and in his view it did so far more effectively 
than any Bill of Rights as in America or special system of 
administrative law as in France. Furthermore, “the source 
of our liberty is not in laws of institutions, but in the spirit of 
a free people”, declared Sir Ivor Jennings in 1940, another 
of the great constitutional law professors of times past.12 
The dominant legal and political thinking in Britain 
until quite recently, therefore, eschewed the concept of 
positive and actionable rights, laying emphasis on a basic 
principle that everyone was free to do whatever they liked 
unless it transgressed common law or statutory limitations, 
and the provision of judicial procedures for guaranteeing 
liberty. The prevalent view was that declarations of rights 
were the sign of an immature or defective civil society, 
whereas Britain was regarded as having produced a near-
perfect constitution through a long evolutionary process 
based upon respect for the rule of law. Declarations of 
rights were associated with revolutionary France and the 
Napoleonic codifi cation of laws that was at odds with 
the Westminster system of parliamentary government 
and the English common law tradition. Furthermore, “a 
Bill of Rights is not an automatic guarantee of liberty; its 
effi cacy depends on the integrity of the institutions which 
apply it, and ultimately on the determination of the people 
that it should be maintained”, wrote the Home Offi ce in a 
discussion paper on human rights legislation in 1976.
IV. Early Ideas on a Modern Bill of Rights
However starting in the 1960s, social and political 
attitudes towards authority and its public institutions 
began to change in the wake of the Second World War. This 
was driven by the realisation that Britain was no longer a 
great world power, a decline in its national economy, and 
the evaporation of its distinctive class structure of society 
and with it diffused habits of deference. The country’s 
constitutional arrangements which had been exported 
around the world to its former colonies, sometimes with 
charters of fundamental rights and freedoms included, 
was no longer as sacrosanct as it had been before 1945. A 
rising movement across the political parties and in legal 
professions was that the institutions and processes of the 
constitution and its integral parts for promoting democracy 
and civil liberty were failing to keep apace with social and 
technological developments and were now in need of 
modernisation and reform. 
The earliest advocates drew attention to the early 
constitutional warnings of J. S. Mill about the “tyranny of 
the majority” being an inherent risk in the newly emerging 
democratic arrangements of Britain and the west, 
necessitating new safeguards for individual and minority 
rights and freedoms.
“Such phrases as ‘self-government’ and ‘the power of 
the people over themselves’, do not express the true 
state of the case. The ‘people’ who exercise the power 
are not always the same people with those over whom it 
is exercised; and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not 
the government of each by himself, but of each by all 
the reset. The will of the people, moreover, practically 
means the will of the most numerous or the most active 
part of the people – the majority, or those who succeed in 
making themselves accepted as the majority; the people, 
consequently, may desire to oppress a part of their 
number, and precautions are as much needed against 
this as against any other abuse of power. The limitation, 
therefore, of the power of government over individuals 
loses none of its importance when the holders of power 
are regularly accountable to the community, that is, to 
the strongest party therein”.13
In 1974 Lord Scarman, a former chairman of the 
Law Commmission and later Law Lord, developed this 
theorising into a critique of the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty itself, the fundamental dogma of British 
constitutionalism and legislative supremacy of Parliament, 
setting out the view that a new constitutional settlement 
was needed to protect civil liberties by way of entrenched 
provisions in the fi eld of fundamental human rights.14 Two 
years later, the fi rst high-profi le call for a new constitution 
with an entrenched Bill of Rights came in a televised BBC 
lecture by Lord Hailsham, a former Conservative party 
chairman and later Lord Chancellor, saying, “Surely if it 
is to be worth the paper it is written on, a Bill of Rights 
must be part of a written constitution in which the powers 
of the legislature are limited and subject to review by 
the courts”.15 Then the same year, Lord Wade introduced 
a Bill of Rights Bill into the House of Lords, identical in 
form to a similarly named Bill presented to the House of 
Commons by Alan Beith the previous year. The long title 
of these were, “A Bill to declare the inalienable rights 
and liberties of the subject”: a curious use of the term 
“subject” to foreign observers, but one which has been – 
and remains – customary in offi cial terminology because 
of the continuing existence of the Crown and the political 
mythology that surrounds it. 
This led directly to a Select Committee inquiry into the 
desirability of a Bill of Rights, and if thought desirable, 
the form it should take.16 By a six to fi ve majority the 
Committee was in favour of a Bill of Rights, and all 
agreed that, “If there was to be a Bill of this kind, the only 
feasible way of proceeding was to rest on the European 
Convention on Human Rights”. Their primary reason for 
using the articles of the ECHR was not to align Britain with 
the public international law of universal human rights, or 
European civilised values, but simply because members – 
rightly or wrongly – did not believe it was practical politics 
to believe the political parties could ever agree on what any 
other form of wording for the rights and freedoms of the 
individual should be (“a fruitless exercise”); and anyway 
in their thinking, the ECHR had been drafted by British 
lawyers on the basis of rights recognised as existing in the 
UK, so surely they were suitable for a British Bill of Rights.17 
A specially interesting part of the Select Committee’s 
report is its ideas on entrenchment, in other words whether 
and if so how the Bill of Rights might be given a status 
in law superior to ordinary parliamentary enactments, lay 
down a special procedure for any future amendment, and 
11  See The Law of the Constitution (1885; 10th ed. 1985), pp. 39-41, 
87-91.
12  See The British Constitution (1940; 5th ed. 1966), pp. 203-9.
13  J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1859; Pelican ed., 1979), p. 62.
14  Sir Leslie Scarman, English Law – The New Dimension 
(Hamlyn Lectures, 1974).
15  Lord Hailsham, Elective Dictatorship (Dimbleby Lecture, 
1976).
16  House of Lords, Select Committee on a Bill of Rights, HL 
(1977-78) 176.
17  Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (later Lord Kilmuir and UK Lord 
Chancellor) was chairman of the Council of Europe’s Consultative 
Assembly’s Legal and Administrative Questions Committee 
that made the original recommendations on the content of the 
Convention submitted to the Committee of Ministers, and it was 
Sir Oscar Dowson (a retired legal adviser at the UK Home Offi ce) 
who drafted the wording of articles 2 to 17 (drawing heavily on the 
Universal Declaration) which was accepted by the Committee almost 
verbatim. See Robert Blackburn, “The United Kingdom”, Chapter 36 
in Robert Blackburn and Jörg Polakiewicz (eds.), Fundamental 
Rights in Europe: The ECHR and its Member States (2001).
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thus empower the judiciary (or a special court established 
for the purpose) to invalidate any provisions in ordinary 
later statutes contrary to the human rights articles in the 
Bill. The Committee fl atly rejected any such proposition, 
not on grounds of political logic or reasoning, but simply 
because it accepted the opinion of their specialist adviser 
that it was a legal impossibility. “One thing is clear”, the 
Committee said in its report, “there is no way in which 
a Bill of Rights could be made immune altogether from 
amendment or repeal by a subsequent Act.”18 In reaching 
this conclusion, their legal adviser Mr G. Rippengal drew 
on judicial precedents such as Vauxhall Estates v. Liverpool 
Corporation (1932) and Re Ellen Street (1934)19 and referred 
to Professor Dicey who had proclaimed parliamentary 
sovereignty to mean, “fi rst, the power of the legislative to 
alter any law, fundamental or otherwise, as freely and in 
the same manner as other laws; secondly, the absence of 
any distinction between constitutional and any other laws; 
thirdly, the non-existence of any judicial or other authority 
having the right to nullify an Act of Parliament, or to treat it 
as void or unconstitutional”.20 In Mr Rippengal’s view, any 
entrenching article in a Bill of Rights would be inoperative, 
since any later offending statutory provision enacted after 
its passage would always be upheld by the courts. 
In the writer’s view these ideas were, and are, misplaced. 
If the UK Parliament – especially with all party support 
and/or a referendum in support – chose to enact a new 
constitutional arrangement between itself and the judiciary, 
it is very unlikely the courts would refuse to accept it. As 
I have suggested elsewhere,21 two legal devices might be 
employed in support: fi rstly the terms of judicial offi ce 
be altered by general agreement to include a declaration 
to uphold the terms of the Bill of Rights,22 and secondly 
the Supreme Court issuing a Practice Statement on the 
special legal status and priority to be afforded to the Bill 
of Rights. However, a better form of entrenchment for a 
stand alone Bill of Rights in the UK would be a qualifi ed 
form of entrenchment, similar to that adopted by the 
Canadian Parliament for its country’s Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms.23 For UK purposes, this would involve the 
Bill of Rights containing a provision that it was to prevail 
over all subsequent enactments except those where the 
later Act of Parliament expressly states that it shall operate 
notwithstanding anything in the Bill of Rights. 
V. Growing Support during the Thatcher Years
During the Thatcher years of the 1980s a series of 
legislative attempts was made by backbench peers and 
MPs to enact a Bill of Rights. Whilst standing no chance of 
success in reaching the statute book without government 
support, these Private Members Bills generated 
considerable debate, disclosing the ideas underpinning 
support or opposition to such a measure. Throughout, 
Margaret Thatcher, never a constitutional reformer herself 
(though ironically a radical in reforming the public services 
and civil service), remained resolutely opposed to both the 
idea of a Bill of Rights and incorporation of the ECHR24 
(though again ironically, her fi rst election manifesto in 1979 
had contained a pledge to hold all party talks on a “possible 
Bill of Rights”,25 a policy her close ally and intellectual 
partner Keith Joseph actively advocated26). 
A case study of the 1983-87 Parliament, a formative period 
in the history of the debate, is instructive. The Bills introduced 
and debated included the European Human Rights 
Convention Bill (1983-84 session),27 the Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms Bill (1985-86 session),28 and the 
Human Rights Bill (1986-87).29 A primary concern expressed 
by supporters was the dramatically changed circumstances 
in political and public life and massively extended scale 
of government intervention since the Victorian era when 
Dicey and the classic works on the British constitution were 
propounding the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law. Thus in the opinion of David Steel, now Lord 
Steel and former leader of the Liberal Party, 
“When I was a student of constitutional law at Edinburgh 
University I was brought up on the classic doctrines of 
Dicey and the supremacy of Parliament. In my 20 years in 
the House [of Commons] I have come to recognise that 
the need for the Bill arises precisely because many of us 
feel that Parliament on its own can no longer adequately 
protect our citizens. The increase in the executive arm of 
Government and in the number of areas of Government 
activity, under Governments of all parties, and the 
increasing complexity and speed of modern life have 
meant that the individual is in need of greater protection, 
but is afforded less... The sheer scope of Government 
activity and the bureaucracy and technology that support 
it have increased exponentially over the past century 
since Dicey was writing his learned works. Inevitably, the 
individual is at an increasing disadvantage in the massive 
system of social management and is ultimately out of 
control, which is inherent in the world of computer fi les, 
satellite surveillance and telephone tapping”.30
During this period, the number of complaints of human 
rights violations going to the European Court of Human 
Rights from Britain started to increase dramatically, 
including some much publicised cases where the country 
was subsequently found to have been in breach of the 
Convention.31 This prompted numerous parliamentarians 
18  Para. 14.
19  [1932] 1 KB 733 and [1934] 1 KB 590 respectively.
20  A. V. Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (1885; 9th ed. 1939), p. 91.
21  Robert Blackburn, Towards a Constitutional Bill of Rights for 
the United Kingdom (1999), “Methods of Entrenching a UK Bill of 
Rights”, pp. 55-67.
22  See also H.W.R. Wade, Constitutional Fundamentals (1980), p. 37.
23  Constitution Act 1982 (79), Schedule B, Part I, section 33 
(Canada).
24  “We believe it is for Parliament rather than the judiciary to 
determine how these [human rights] principles are best secured”, 
Commons Hansard, 6 July 1989, cols. WA251-2. Her successor John 
Major as Conservative leader and Prime Minister expressed a 
similar view: see Commons Hansard, 15 January 1993, col. WA822.
25  Conservative Party Election Manifesto 1979, p. 21: “There are 
other important matters, such as a possible Bill of Rights... which 
we shall wish to discuss with all parties”.
26  Keith Joseph, Freedom under the Law (Conservative Political 
Centre, 1975)
27  HC (1983-84) 73 presented by Robert Maclennan.
28  HL (1985-86) 21 presented by Lord Broxbourne, with active 
support from Lord Scarman.
29   HC (1986-87) 19 presented by Sir Edward Gardiner.
30  Commons Hansard, 6 February 1987, cols. 1231/2.
31  High profi le cases around this time included Campbell and 
Cosans, 1982, 3 HRLJ 221 (1982) (corporal punishment/caning 
of state school children, leading to Education No. 2 Act 1986, 
section 47); Silver and others, 1983, 4 HRLJ 227 (1983) (interference 
with prisoners’ correspondence, leading to Prison (Amendment) 
Rules 1983, S.I. 1983/568); Campbell and Fell, 1984, 6 HRLJ 255 
(1985) (restrictions on prisoners’ legal representation and conduct 
of disciplinary proceedings, leading to new procedural rights for 
prisoners including publicly-funded representation); Malone, 1984, 
5 HRLJ 319 (1984) (absence of controls over state telephone-
tapping, leading to Interception of Communications Act 1985); 
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, 1985 (sex discrimination in 
immigration, leading to Statement of Changes in Immigration 
Rules, laid before Parliament on 15 July 1985, HC 503); Gillow, 
1986 (Guernsey removal of pre-existing home occupation rights, 
leading to damages and cessation of housing restriction); Weeks, 
1987 (arbitrary detention of mentally disorders offenders serving 
life sentences, leading to government statement that Court of 
Appeal henceforth unlikely to impose life sentences in similar 
cases); O, H, W, B and R (Parental Access), 1987 (restrictions/denial 
of parents’ access to, and independent legal review of, children 
compulsorily taken into state care, leading to new code of practice 
and Children Act 1989, sections 22 and 34).
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to support a Bill of Rights, by decrying having to go to the 
Strasbourg court to obtain redress for individual grievances 
on human rights grounds when in their view the British 
courts were more appropriate for deciding such matters. 
For example, on the better qualifi cations of UK judges, two 
MPs commented, “They [the judges of the Human Rights 
Court] need have no legal qualifi cations” (Mr Hanley), and 
“It is a purely political court” (Mr Budgen).32 This link with 
the European Court of Human Rights served to further 
confl ate ideas for a Bill of Rights with incorporation of the 
ECHR into domestic law. On the need to limit cases going 
to Strasbourg, one Member said,
“It would help the image of Britain if those rights were 
brought into our law, because fewer cases would be 
ruled admissible by the court [at Strasbourg], to the 
humiliation of this country. We have been ruled against 
in twice as many cases as any other country in Europe. 
That is a national humiliation. We would not face that if 
we could pursue rights in our own courts in our own way. 
That is a major practical argument.”33
This idea that incorporating the ECHR would stem the 
rising tide of UK cases going to Strasbourg reappeared as 
part of the government’s reasons for the Human Rights 
Act 1998, though in fact the number and frequency of 
cases continued to grow, possibly because the net effect 
of the Act was to promote even wider awareness and 
therefore litigiousness in the population at large and the 
legal profession, most of whom until the 1990s except a few 
specialist practitioners were barely aware of the ECHR or 
its relevance to their everyday work.
Opposition to a new Bill of Rights during this Parliament 
relied principally on traditional attitudes towards the 
British constitution, especially where any enhanced powers 
to the judiciary were being proposed. For Lord Denning, 
a former Law Lord and Master of the Rolls, this “offends 
all our constitutional principles”. He went on to add that 
any charter of rights in the UK would trigger “a myriad of 
cases by a lot of crackpots”.34 Above all, it was a perceived 
fear of politicising the judiciary that was cited in opposition 
to a Bill of Rights. According to Sir Patrick Mayhew, later 
Attorney General,
“The judiciary must be seen to be impartial. More 
especially, as far as practicable it must be kept free 
from political controversy. We must take great care not 
to propel judges into the political arena. However, that 
is what we would do if we asked them to take policy 
decisions of a nature that we ought properly to take 
ourselves and which under our present constitution we 
do take. We would increase that danger if we required or 
permitted them to alter or even reverse decisions taken 
by Parliament. For a long time I have felt that herein lies 
the key to the general issue that we are debating.”35
A more subtle argument employed against a Bill of Rights 
in the UK is that it would have the net effect of diminishing 
the role of Members of Parliament in defending the civil 
liberties of their constituents and making representations 
to ministers on their behalf for redress. Alexander (later 
Lord) Carlisle QC put this point well in the House of 
Commons, saying, 
“I fi nd it annoying when I go to a Minister to make 
representations on behalf of my constituents only to be 
told, ‘There is nothing that I can do about that, because 
it is up to the courts or a tribunal to provide a remedy’. 
It is annoying when I have a detailed and diffi cult case 
involving my constituents and I want to refer it to 
the ombudsman and he says, ‘Your constituent has a 
theoretical remedy by taking it through the courts or to 
a tribunal. I cannot investigate’. There is a danger that 
the Bill of Rights may well become an excuse for people 
to say that certain matters should not be resolved in the 
House but that the individual involved should take it 
outside and pursue it through the courts”.36
VI. Labour Ideology on a Bill of Rights
Generally speaking, opposition parties tend to be fonder 
of constitutional reform ideas than governments for the 
simple reason that strengthening the constitution almost 
always means weakening or imposing new limitations 
upon executive action. The defeat of the Labour Party 
at the British general elections in 1983, 1987 and 1992 
produced a sense of desperation and a new willingness to 
embrace political reforms that had in earlier times seemed 
irrelevant to its core objectives in the fi eld of social and 
economic affairs. In 1992 one of the fi rst steps of the party’s 
new and widely respected leader John Smith, a barrister 
and Queen’s Counsel, was to champion the cause of 
radical constitutional reform, including incorporation of 
the ECHR into domestic law and a national Bill of Rights, 
pointing in the direction of a written UK constitution: 
“Are we going to limp into the 21st century on a 
constitution built for the 19th? ... We need a new 
constitution for a new century ... We must modernise 
our system of government so that it is underpinned by 
the specific recognition of individual rights. The time 
has come when we should commit ourselves to a Bill of 
Rights.”37 
Smith immediately commissioned a comprehensive 
policy review on the constitution, resulting in its report, 
A New Agenda for Democracy: Labour’s Proposals 
for Constitutional Reform. That review proved to be a 
signifi cant turning point in Labour Party thinking, not only 
on constitutional reform generally but on human rights 
reform in particular. It proposed a two-stage approach to a 
Bill of Rights: fi rstly, the European Convention on Human 
Rights should be incorporated into UK domestic law; then 
second, work should begin on developing a constitutional 
Bill of Rights indigenous to the UK. As Labour’s report 
concluded, 
“The incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights is a necessary first step ... [but] it is not a 
substitute for our own written Bill of Rights ... There is a 
good case for drafting our own Bill of Rights”. 
This second stage of reform, the report recommended, 
would involve “the establishment of an all-party 
commission that will be charged with drafting the Bill of 
Rights and considering a suitable method of entrenchment. 
This should report to Parliament within a specified and 
limited period of time.” 
John Smith tragically died from a heart attack in 1994, 
and it was left to Tony Blair as his successor as Labour 
leader to carry forward Smith’s legacy in the field of 
constitutional affairs. In his leadership election statement 
in 1994, Blair endorsed the commitment “to entrenching 
clear rights for every citizen in a Bill of Rights for Britain”. 
Later the same year at his first party conference as leader, 
he promised that in government he would put forward “the 
biggest programme of change to democracy ever proposed 
by a political party”, involving as one of its primary tasks, 
“every citizen to be protected by fundamental rights 
that cannot be taken away by the state or their fellow 
citizens enshrined in a Bill of Rights”. The collaboration 
32  Commons Hansard, 6 February 1987, col. 1236. This of course 
is incorrect: under ECHR article 21 appointed judges “must either 
possess the qualifi cations required for appointment to high judicial 
offi ce or be jurisconsults of recognised competence”.
33  Commons Hansard, 6 February 1987, col. 1240.
34  Vol. 469, cols. 171-172; to which Lord Scarman replied that the 
UK judiciary particularly in the fi eld of judicial review “have a long 
experience of dealing with cranks. We are paid to do that”.
35  Commons Hansard, 6 February 1987, col. 1267.
36  Commons Hansard, 6 February 1987, col. 1262.
37  A Citizens’ Democracy (speech, 1 March 1993).
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he forged with the Liberal Democrats prior to the 1997 
election (involving a Joint Consultative Committee on 
Constitutional Reform in 1996-97, and after the 1997 
election that Labour won by a large overall majority a 
special Cabinet Committee comprising a similar Joint 
Consultative Committee with senior Liberal Democrats 
on policy issues of joint interest) reinforced this objective, 
since the adoption of a constitutional Bill of Rights had 
been settled Liberal Democrat policy since the 1980s.
However in 1996 as the pending general election 
approached, Tony Blair and his key Shadow Cabinet 
members decided to quietly drop the party’s earlier 
commitment to a Bill of Rights.38 Instead of his earlier 
rhetoric on human rights reform, the Labour election 
manifesto now stated, 
“Citizens should have statutory rights to enforce their 
human rights in the UK courts. We will by statute 
incorporate the European Convention on Human 
Rights into UK law to bring these rights home and allow 
our people access to them in their national courts. The 
incorporation will establish a fl oor, not a ceiling, for 
human rights. Parliament will remain free to enhance 
these rights, for example by a Freedom of Information 
Act.”39
There was no mention of a complementary and 
subsequent Bill of Rights. It seems that Tony Blair was 
principally concerned with his management and delivery 
of a programme for government, and he regarded the 
hurdle of a constitutional Bill of Rights as too ambitious 
and fraught with diffi culties, with little benefi t either to 
himself or the government in electoral terms. This then left 
the Human Rights Act that emerged from the Home Offi ce 
under Jack Straw’s stewardship a year later half-baked 
from the comprehensive programme of reform drawn up 
under John Smith, and a compromise of differing interests 
in terms of its UK and European political geography. If 
the Human Rights Act was to be regarded as a British 
Bill of Rights in itself,40 therefore requiring no further 
documentation of such a name, it fell short of the essential 
characteristic of asserting British national values. It thus 
ended up falling between two stools, being constantly 
criticised by the Euro-sceptic lobby in British political and 
parliamentary life.
VII. Ideas and Pressures Shaping the Human Rights Act
Once in offi ce after the 1st May 1997 general election that 
gave Labour a 179 seat majority in the House of Commons, 
the new Cabinet had to choose which proposals among its 
constitutional reform agenda to prioritise and deal with in 
its fi rst annual session of Parliament.41 The two selected 
were devolution, regarded as “unfi nished business” from 
the 1970s (leading to the Scotland Act 1998, Government 
of Wales Act 1998, and Northern Ireland Act 1998), and 
incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (which became the Human Rights Act 1998). 
Over the summer of 1997, intense discussions on the form 
and content of the Human Rights Bill took place within 
the Home Offi ce, and deliberations were held with a task 
force of special interest groups, orchestrated by Jack Straw 
and his advisers on the shaping of the legislation. A public 
consultation on the subject had already been conducted 
within the previous year whilst in opposition through a 
discussion paper entitled Bringing Rights Home. Perhaps 
there is never complete uniformity of purpose or reasoning 
behind any major measure of political or constitutional 
reform, but in the case of the Human Rights Bill there 
were certainly disparate pressures that led to its particular 
form and content. Among them in the shaping of the Bill 
were political short-termism and an ad hoc approach to 
constitutional reform, instead of the coherent ideological 
strategy necessary for the type of constitutional settlement 
for the twenty-fi rst century that had been envisaged earlier 
by John Smith. 
The key element in the Human Rights Act 199842 most 
proximate to a Bill of Rights was that human rights became 
actionable in the domestic courts, and a judicial remedy 
could be given to anyone in the UK found to have been a 
victim of a human rights violation. Unlike a normal Bill of 
Rights in an entrenched constitution however, the courts 
were given no power to invalidate any legislative measure 
that violates their human rights, nor provide a remedy 
to victims of such legislative abuse, thus preserving the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. All the courts may 
do is make a declaration that in its opinion the legislation 
is incompatible with the European Convention on Human 
Rights, and the government at its political discretion 
may consider whether to reform or correct the offending 
piece of legislation. In other words, the Act provides for 
the courts to go through the motion of judicial review 
of primary legislation, but without conferring the reality 
of actual judicial control, leaving litigants frustrated and 
it to the prerogative of politicians to correct the legal 
incompatibility with ECHR articles in whatever way 
suited it best, usually minimally, and in a special fast-track 
law-making process set out in the Act that allows for no 
amendment by Parliament.
The international character of the Human Rights Act 
is emphasised by the courts being directed to interpret 
domestic legislation and develop the common law (ss.2 
and 3) in a manner consistent with the articles of the ECHR 
and rulings of the European Court of Human Rights, and 
its provision for the appointment of judges of the European 
Court of Human Rights (s.18). As to whether the Human 
Rights Act should be viewed as actually “incorporating” or 
simply giving “further effect” to the articles of the ECHR, 
a curious exchange of views on the matter was expressed 
during the House of Lords debates on the Bill. The minister 
responsible for piloting the Bill through the House, the 
Lord Chancellor Lord Derry Irvine, emphatically denied 
that the Bill incorporated the ECHR articles into UK 
domestic law, when to most people’s minds that was 
precisely what the Bill did. 
“The Bill as such does not incorporate Convention rights 
into domestic law... I have to make this point absolutely 
plain. The European Convention on Human Rights 
under this Bill is not made part of our law. The Bill gives 
the European Convention on Human Rights a special 
relationship which will mean that the courts will give 
effect to the interpretative provisions to which I have 
already referred, but it does not make the Convention 
directly justiciable as it would be if it were expressly 
made part of our law. I want there to be no ambiguity 
about that.”
38  See news report in the Daily Telegraph, 1 November 1996.
39  Labour Party Election Manifesto 1997: Real Rights for 
Citizens, p. 35.
40  The Independent Commission on a Bill of Rights in 
2010-11 found that three-quarters of those opposed to a Bill of 
Rights argued that in their view the UK already has a Bill of Rights, 
namely the Human Rights Act: see its Report, p. 14, para.26; and 
for an example of this view, see Francesca Klug, A Bill of Rights: 
do we need one or do we already have one? (LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 2/2007).
41  For commentary see Robert Blackburn and Raymond (Lord) 
Plant (eds.), Constitutional Reform: The Labour Government’s 
Constitutional Reform Agenda (1999).
42  The provisions of the Act, which are well-known, are not set 
out at length here: for full details and documentation (including 
the legislative text, original form of the bill and explanatory 
memorandum, accompanying government white paper, and 
parliamentary debates) see Robert Blackburn, Towards a Consti-
tutional Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom (1999), chapter 3.
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So in Lord Irvine’s view, European human rights had not 
been implanted in UK domestic law; the UK courts were 
simply being permitted to give judicial notice of them, and 
provide remedies themselves in legal actions that could 
otherwise be taken directly to Strasbourg.
VIII. The Aftermath of the Human Rights Act
The immediate effect of the Human Rights Act was to 
kill the Bill of Rights debate stone dead for eight years. As 
an idea and proposal it was barely discussed or mentioned 
in politics and public discussions at all over this period. The 
whole attention of the human rights community, and critics 
of the Act, was focussed on the extent and nature of its 
impact, and the extensive preparations and changes being 
made across the legal, political and administrative life of 
the country. 
These preparations and changes were very substantial. 
They started with the most extensive education and 
training sessions ever seen for British judges, civil servants 
and other public offi cials on the law and working of the 
ECHR and the new human rights obligations on public 
authorities to be complied with, which took place over the 
two-year period between the Royal Assent to the Human 
Rights Act on 9th November 1998 and its entry into force 
on 2nd October 2000. The Act was being treated like a Bill 
of Rights not simply because of the actionable nature of 
the individual rights in the legislation, but because of the 
massive organisational changes being made in the UK state, 
politically as well as legally. Thus to supervise the workings 
of the Act and strengthen the role of Parliament in the 
protection of human rights generally, a Joint Committee 
of both Houses of Parliament on Human Rights was 
established in late 2000 with terms of reference to consider 
“matters relating to human rights in the United Kingdom 
(but excluding consideration of individual cases)”,43 as 
well as to scrutinise and report on proposed remedial 
orders under section 10 of the Act (which provides a fast-
track legislative process similar to statutory instruments 
to respond to judgments in the UK courts or European 
Court of Human Rights that a provision of UK law was 
incompatible with the ECHR and bring it into conformity 
with their ruling).44 Work began on harmonising the various 
existing equality commissions45 with a powerful single 
body to promote and protect human rights, which became 
the Equality and Human Rights Commission under the 
Equality Act 2006.46 
Then, quite suddenly and unexpectedly, the Bill of 
Rights debate was reignited by a speech made by the new 
Conservative leader, David Cameron, on 26th June 2006.47 
Conservative front-bench opposition to the Human Rights 
Act in 1997-98, and its criticism of its effects, was now 
translated into advocacy of a “modern British Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities”. Mr Cameron argued that the Human 
Rights Act had made it harder for ministers to protect 
our security, done little to protect some of our liberties, 
hampered the fi ght against crime and terrorism, and 
helped create a culture of rights without responsibilities: 
and “the truth is, Labour got us into this mess”. He would 
therefore now be conducting a review of how the nature of 
Britain’s participation in the ECHR could be aligned with 
the principles and legal effect of the modern Bill of Rights 
he was advocating. 
This represented a considerable political challenge to the 
Labour government. The Blair administration was exhausted 
after its efforts over its human rights reform programme, 
but when Gordon Brown succeeded him as Prime Minister 
in 2007, he immediately grasped the Bill of Rights agenda 
as part of his own vision for Britain’s constitutional future, 
and was not going to allow the Conservative Party to steal 
Labour’s moral high ground as the champions of human 
rights. Only days after he took offi ce, a major new Labour 
government reform initiative was published in a green 
paper, The Governance of Britain, on which Brown had 
been working for months beforehand in the expectation of 
his accession to the premiership, in which he presented the 
case for a “British Bill of Rights and Duties”.48
The tone and substance of the Bill of Rights debate 
had now changed. As time moved on in the aftermath 
of 1998, it was the inability of the Human Rights Act to 
provide an expression of British-ness and national civic 
values that became exposed as its essential weakness for 
serving as a genuine Bill of Rights. Having abandoned its 
strategy of constructing a constitutional Bill of Rights in 
1996, a new formulation of Labour policy was required to 
rebut the Conservatives’ unexpected espousal of such a 
document. Brown’s solution was to champion a distinctive 
notion of British citizenship.49 In its section on “Britain’s 
Future: The Citizen and the State”, Mr Brown’s green 
paper emphasised the importance of “our common British 
values”, stating that,
“It is important to be clearer about what it means to be 
British, what it means to be part of British society and, 
crucially, to be resolute in making the point that what 
comes with that is a set of values which have not just got 
be shared but also accepted. There is room to celebrate 
multiple and different identities, but none of these 
should take precedence over the core democratic values 
that defi ne what it means to be British. A British citizen, 
playing a part in British society, must act in accordance 
with these values.”50
Calling for a fuller articulation of these values, and the 
ideals and principles that bound our society together, it went 
on to present its case for a British Bill of Rights and Duties. 
This reform, the document said, could provide explicit 
recognition that human rights come with responsibilities 
and give clarity to a framework for the relationship between 
citizens, the community, society and the state. In support of 
this initiative, Lord Goldsmith, a former Attorney General, 
was despatched to conduct a “Citizenship Review” 
suggesting ways of promoting rights and responsibilities,51 
and the Ministry of Justice worked on a further discussion 
paper entitled Rights and Responsibilities: Developing our 
Constitutional Framework.52 
43  In practice this has been treated by the Committee as a 
role to scrutinise every government Bill for its compatibility 
with human rights, not only those described in the ECHR but 
common law fundamental rights and liberties and human rights 
contained in other international obligations of the UK, and to 
conduct occasional thematic inquiries: see its website http://www.
parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/
human-rights-committee
44  House of Commons Standing Orders (Public Business), 
February 2016, SO 152(B)(2).
45  Commission for Racial Equality, Equal Opportunities 
Commission, and Disability Rights Commission.
46  Now replaced by the Equality Act 2010, which see for 
its extensive terms of reference (including investigatory and 
enforcement powers).
47  David Cameron, “Balancing Freedom and Security: A 
Modern British Bill of Rights” (Centre for Policy Studies, 2006): 
see further below at p. 318.
48  Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Cm. 7170 
(2007).
49  Interestingly there were precedents for this suggesting a 
tendency for Prime Ministers to become fond of ideas of citizenship: 
see Robert Blackburn (ed.), Rights of Citizenship (1993) especially 
its Introduction on John Major’s citizenship initiative.
50  Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain, Cm. 7170 
(2007), paras. 195-196.
51  Published as Citizenship: Our Commons Bond (2008).
52  Cm. 7577 (2009). On the academic debate, see Stephan 
Parmentier, Hans Werdmolder and Michael Merrigan (eds.), 
Between Rights and Responsibilities: A Fundamental Debate (2016).
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Labour Party thinking on the subject was by now 
becoming increasingly convoluted53 and intellectualised, 
infused with some earlier communitarianism philosophy54 
that had been infl uential in the early days of Tony Blair’s 
administration, helping him shape his Third Way rhetoric 
and the idea of New Labour being a departure from the 
traditional socialism of the Labour Party and divide 
between the two main British political parties. Gordon 
Brown himself had been an academic historian prior to 
entering politics, with a special interest in the Scottish 
enlightenment. In a speech on Liberty he gave at the 
University of Westminster in 2007, Mr Brown gave a 
romantic account of British ideas on freedom ever since 
Magna Carta saying, “a passion for liberty has determined 
the decisive political debates in our history” and that it 
was time to “write a new chapter in our country’s story of 
liberty” through the debate he was launching on a Bill of 
Rights and Duties.
However, the main stumbling block to any formulation of 
these ideas into government legislation was simply dissent 
and antagonism within the Labour Party and Cabinet to the 
idea of strengthening the UK judiciary. The Labour Party 
has a long tradition of suspicion of the judiciary and mistrust 
over whether they can act impartially, being perceived as a 
bulwark of the establishment, perpetuating conservative-
minded values in their rulings. To a large extent this is part 
of party folklore stemming from the early days of the trade 
union movement which created the Labour Party, when a 
series of legal actions by private companies and employers 
went against them in the courts, such as Lyons v Wilkins 
(1899)55 and Taff Vale (1901).56 A speech in Washington by 
the then Justice Secretary Jack Straw, who was given the 
ministerial brief to develop a Bill of Rights, illustrates this 
hesitancy on how such a document could ever work if not 
given entrenched legal and judicial force. 
“In seeking to bring greater clarity and status to the 
relationship between the citizen, the state and the 
community, we in the UK have to be constantly mindful 
of the scope and extent of their justiciability... The 
formulation of such a Bill is not a simple binary choice 
between a fully justiciable text on the one hand, or 
a purely symbolic text on the other... A Bill of Rights 
and Responsibilities could give people a clearer idea of 
what we can expect from the state and from each other, 
and provide an ethical framework for giving practical 
effect to our common values. In an enabling state, in 
a democratic society, it is far more than the law which 
binds us together.”57
In the event, lack of agreement within the Labour Cabinet 
sabotaged any outcome, and Mr Straw’s proposed Bill that 
his civil servants had spent considerable time on remained 
unpublished and was abandoned. 
Meanwhile, prompted by the government’s 2007 
initiative, the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 
Parliament carried out its own inquiry on a Bill of Rights 
in the 2007-08 session, recommending the enactment of a 
“Bill of Rights and Freedoms”.58 It rejected Labour and 
Conservative proposals for the inclusion of duties and 
responsibilities, and believed that a number of individual 
rights beyond those in the ECHR should be included, such 
as jury trial and children’s rights. On its legal effect, while 
the Committee did not believe the courts should have the 
power to strike down legislation, it believed that like the 
Human Rights Act the courts should interpret legislation 
whenever enacted for conformity with the Bill of Rights 
unless Parliament decided to pass incompatible legislation 
and made clear its intention to do so.
IX. Current Conservative Plans for a Bill of Rights
While Gordon Brown as Prime Minister sought to 
retrieve the idea of responsibilities of citizenship back 
from David Cameron, he kept clear of the European 
dimension of the Bill of Rights debate. However it was this 
that the Conservatives addressed in a major way, tapping 
into a powerful impulse of Euro-scepticism in British 
political life, especially on the populist right of his party. 
Between Mr Cameron’s speech in 2006 and the proposals 
of his party published in 2014, a mounting campaign took 
place to discredit the authority of the European Court of 
Human Rights in the UK, both in the infl uence it had upon 
UK judicial rulings under section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act, and upon the binding effect of its judgments when the 
Strasbourg court found the UK to be in violation of the 
ECHR.59 Thus in 2008 the then shadow Justice Secretary 
Nick Herbert belittled the work of the Court for making 
a ruling that prisoner’s human rights had been violated 
because of a blocked toilet in his cell,60 arguing that dealing 
with matters that were essentially ones of administrative 
effi ciency diminished the status of the ECHR and Court, 
which should be reserved for much larger and heinous 
human rights abuses.61 The Conservatives, he added, wanted 
“a settlement that restrains the infl uence of Strasbourg 
case law, and truly allows the development of a distinctive 
jurisprudence on human rights”. 
Formal proposals of the Conservative Party published in 
201462 then advocated the complete repeal of the Human 
Rights Act that incorporated the ECHR into domestic 
law and required the UK judiciary to take into account 
the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
in their interpretation of statutes and development of the 
common law.63 However, ironically these Conservative 
plans then stated that the articles of the ECHR would be 
taken as the basis for the British Bill of Rights:
“The key objectives of our new Bill are: Repeal Labour’s 
Human Rights Act. Put the text of the original Human 
Rights Convention into primary legislation. There is 
nothing wrong with that original document, which 
contains a sensible mix of checks and balances alongside 
53  Another complication was the need to harmonise any 
proposals with the work being done to construct a Bill of Rights 
for Northern Ireland under the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 
1998: see Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, A Bill of 
Rights for Northern Ireland (December 2008).
54  See Amitai Etzioni, The New Golden Rule (1996), and The 
Responsive Community journal.
55  J. Lyons and Sons Ltd v. Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch. 255.
56  Taff Vale Railway Co v. Amalgamated Society of Railway 
Servants [1901] UKHL 1.
57  Jack Straw, “Modernising the Magna Carta”, 13 February 
2008, George Washington University.
58  Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the 
UK?, HL (2007-08) 165. See also the parliamentary debate on a Bill 
of Rights: Commons Hansard, 25 June 2009, col 307WH.
59  On parliamentary opinion at this time see Commons Hansard, 
19 February 2007, col. 68-124 (debate on Human Rights).
60  Peers v. Greece (19 April 2001) and the series of subsequent 
cases on detention conditions and treatment of prisoners, including 
Kalashnikov v. Russia (15 July 2002, 23 HRLJ 378 (2002)) and 
Modârcă v. Moldova (10 May 2007). See also the views of former 
Conservative leader Michael Howard in his article in the Daily 
Telegraph, “Britain can reclaim its human rights laws” (3 October 
2014), in which he argues the European Court of Human Rights 
has brought the concept of human rights “into disrepute” and “the 
way in which the ECHR has been interpreted is far removed from 
its founders’ intentions... We disagree with the way that the courts 
both here and in Strasbourg treat the Convention document as a 
‘living instrument’”.
61  Nick Herbert, “Rights without responsibilities – a decade 
of the Human Rights Act”, Lecture at the British Library, for the 
British Institute of Human Rights, 24 November 2008.
62  Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights 
Laws (2014).
63   Human Rights Act 1998, s.3.
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the rights it sets out, and is a laudable statement of the 
principles for a modern democratic nation.”
Accompanying the Bill would be “clarifi cation” of the 
Convention rights, refl ecting “a proper balance between 
rights and responsibilities... This will ensure that they are 
applied in accordance with the original intentions for the 
Convention and the mainstream understanding of these 
rights”. In other words, the legislation enacting the Bill 
of Rights would have supporting sections giving different 
levels of detail in defi nition, meaning and tests to be applied 
by the UK courts in their determination of claims of human 
rights violation.64 The Conservative ideas are that the Bill 
of Rights would “limit the use of human rights laws to the 
most serious cases... and there will be a threshold below 
which Convention rights will not be engaged, ensuring UK 
courts strike out trivial cases”. 
As mentioned above, senior Conservatives have 
expressed a similar attitude to the working of the 
European Court of Human Rights in applying the ECHR, 
so that it should limit its intervention to the most serious 
violations of human rights. It has been argued that the 
Court’s doctrine of “margin of appreciation” should be 
widened for national systems, and has sought to diminish 
the doctrine that the ECHR should be interpreted by 
the Court as a “living instrument”,65 going beyond the 
scope and limits envisaged by its founding fathers. These 
views were expressed at the Brighton Conference of the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers in April 2012, 
leading to protocols 15 and 16, and the formal inclusion 
of a statement on subsidiarity being inserted into the 
preamble of the Convention.66 There have been plans 
to negotiate fundamental reform of the ECHR so that 
rulings of the Court are advisory only, and even threats 
to withdraw from the ECHR altogether, usually following 
high-profi le Strasbourg judgments against the UK, such 
as in the Hirst case on prisoners’ voting rights.67 The 2014 
Conservative Party policy document proposed to “end the 
ability of the European Court of Human Rights to force 
the UK to change the law” and “every judgment that UK 
law is incompatible with the Convention will be treated 
as advisory and we will introduce a new parliamentary 
procedure to formally consider the judgment. It will only 
be binding in UK law if Parliament agrees that it should be 
enacted as such.”68 In a speech in central London in spring 
2016 when she was Home Secretary, Theresa May, said, 
“The ECHR can bind the hands of parliament, adds 
nothing to our prosperity, makes us less secure by 
preventing the deportation of dangerous foreign 
nationals – and does nothing to change the attitudes 
of governments like Russia’s when it comes to human 
rights... So regardless of the EU referendum, my view 
is this: if we want to reform human rights laws in this 
country, it isn’t the EU we should leave but the ECHR 
and the jurisdiction of its court.”69
However, since her accession to the premiership on 
13th July 2016, following David Cameron’s resignation in 
response to the EU referendum result, Theresa May and 
her new Conservative administration have made it clear 
that they do not propose or intend to leave the ECHR.70 
Elizabeth Truss, the new Justice Secretary, confi rmed 
this position when she gave oral evidence to the House 
of Commons Justice Committee on 7th September 2016. 
This is to be greatly welcomed, for withdrawal from the 
ECHR would be tantamount to repudiating the UK’s role 
and partnership in the historic post-1945 commitments on 
universal human rights and their guarantee by international 
law. 
The question of UK withdrawal from the ECHR 
has been an important point of debate following the 
referendum vote to leave the EU, and although there might 
seem to be consistency in doing so because of Conservative 
ideas of freedom from European laws and institutions 
(quitting the Council of Europe along with the EU), in 
reality the Council of Europe will now become a primary 
international vehicle for diplomacy across the European 
states, and an asset to the UK government in foreign policy 
terms that outweighs the occasional and infrequent irritant 
of an adverse ruling in the European Court of Human 
Rights. On the Conservative administration’s current plans 
for a British Bill of Rights to replace the Human Rights 
Act, at the time of writing71 the new Justice Secretary has 
said little in terms of detail (“the British Bill of Rights will 
protect our rights but in a better way”), and made it clear 
that the legislation will still take some time to design and 
prepare (“clearly there would need to be very thorough 
consultation”).72 
X. Britain’s Constitutional Dilemmas
It is evident from what has been writt en above that 
modern British thought on a British Bill of Rights is far 
from uniform among those who support it. The factors 
persuading supporters of its merits, or its opponents 
of its demerits, have shifted with changing political 
circumstances over the past fi ve decades, and today there 
are still confl icting ideas and pressures behind the proposal. 
Like most constitutional issues, it cannot be categorised as 
a Right-Left subject dividing the parties, even if particular 
factors at any given moment in time are, and have been, 
more persuasive to Conservatives, the Labour Party, and 
the minor parties.73 Currently attitudes towards Europe 
are pivotal in the minds of most Conservatives, even if 
their party is divided on membership of both the EU and 
the Council of Europe, but both main parties appear to 
agree on the need to include a catalogue of duties and 
responsibilities in a Bill of Rights if there were to be one. 
Both parties are resistant to the idea of a Bill of Rights 
64  For a Bill of Rights proposal of this nature, reducing the 
infl uence of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
in matters of judicial interpretation in the UK, and removing 
their binding effect altogether, along with those of the articles of 
the ECHR and decisions of the Committee of Ministers, on any 
person or public authority, see Human Rights Act 1998 (Repeal 
and Substitution) Bill, HC (2012-13) 31.
65  See Tyrer v. United Kingdom (25 April 1978) that inaugurated 
the doctrine into the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights.
66  “The High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the 
principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to secure 
the rights and freedoms defi ned in this Convention and the 
Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of 
appreciation...”.
67  Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) (6 October 2005), 
30 HRLJ 204 (2009-2010).
68  Conservative Party, Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human Rights 
Laws (2014), p. 6.
69  Reported in the Guardian newspaper, 25 April 2016.
70  At her Conservative leadership launch conference on 30th 
June 2016 Theresa May answered a media question on the subject, 
stating that she would not campaign to leave the ECHR, on the 
grounds that it is an issue that divides people and currently carries 
no parliamentary majority.
71  9 September 2016.
72  House of Commons Justice Committee, Oral evidence: The 
work of the Secretary of State, 7 September 2016, HC (2016-17) 
620.
73  The Liberal Democrats have been most consistent in their 
thinking and support for a Bill of Rights, supporting its adoption 
as apart of a written UK constitution as their long-term objective: 
see policy papers reproduced in Robert Blackburn, Towards 
a Constitutional Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom (1999), 
docs. 93, 94.
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being enacted in a way that substantially strengthens the 
power of the judiciary, with attitudes within the Labour 
Party largely affected by suspicions of social bias in the 
British judiciary, and those within the Conservative party 
attitudes affected by antagonism to the infl uence of 
European judges at Strasbourg and Luxemburg. There is 
ambiguity in the rhetoric of “parliamentary sovereignty” 
employed on all sides, particularly in being alternately 
employed as a constitutional doctrine asserting the 
primacy of democratically-elected politicians over un-
elected judges, or national supremacy of British law over 
European and international courts and treaty obligations.
The British political system tolerates a remarkable 
degree of ambiguity, uncertainty and contradiction in 
its constitutional arrangements. This goes much deeper 
than institutional matters such as retaining a hereditary 
Monarchy in a political democracy, and maintaining a 
parliamentary Second Chamber with ninety-two hereditary 
peers, with no agreement on what its fundamental role in 
the constitution should be. Some maintain that Britain 
has now reached a tipping point or crisis74 in its political 
arrangements, arising from the same kind of confl ict of 
thought that currently surrounds the Human Rights Act 
and plans for its replacement by a British Bill of Rights. 
The year 2016 has been singularly signifi cant and traumatic 
in this respect, and never in most people’s lifetime has the 
politics and government of Britain been in such a state of 
turmoil, following the electoral successes of the Scottish 
Nationalist Party pressing for Scotland to secede from 
the Union, the outcome of the June referendum that the 
UK should leave the EU, and confl ict within the Labour 
Party over the selection of its leader and Prime Minister-
in-waiting. 
Both a cause of, and solution to, this malaise is the 
need for a codifi ed, written UK constitution.75 Britain’s 
political problems are largely due to confusion in the basic 
principles of our constitution, one famously “unwritten” – 
which for all intents and purposes means the country does 
not have a one at all, and certainly not one which ordinary 
people can comprehend or buy a copy of to see what the 
rules and procedures are by which we are governed. A 
primary reason for a written constitution in any political 
democracy is to clarify and establish democratic authority 
in the state, articulating who is sovereign for the purpose 
of determining major public policy decisions and the 
law. Much of the controversy over the EU referendum 
result has been due to disagreement on whether it is, or 
should be, the elected House of Commons (where a clear 
majority of members, even among Conservatives, favours 
remaining in the EU) or a majoritarian plebiscite (that 
narrowly voted to leave) that is best equipped in terms 
of democratic principle and informed judgement for 
settling such a fundamental matter of state. Furthermore, 
the unwritten constitution means there is no special 
process for changing fundamental matters of state, and 
David Cameron only ever conceived a referendum 
on EU membership as a political tactic to silence 
backbench Conservative Europhobes and outfl ank the 
UK Independence Party. His predecessor John Major’s 
method of calling confi dence motions in his party and the 
House of Commons for his government’s policies was the 
appropriate constitutional method for this purpose. In 
the event, the referendum spectacularly backfi red on the 
Conservative leader and unless a proper constitutional 
amendment process is soon established by which the UK 
prepares and implements major constitutional change, it 
has created the most terrible precedent for future populist 
governments.76
The incoherence fl owing from existing arrangements 
extends to the muddle in which Britain now chooses 
its Head of Government. Under a US-style separation 
of powers the electorate directly choose its President, 
who then requires the consent of a separately elected 
Congress to enact laws and approve major public 
policy decisions. By contrast under the UK system of 
parliamentary government, with a fused executive/
legislature membership whose virtue rests precisely on the 
direct personal accountability and relationship of a Prime 
Minister to the House of Commons, the successive rule 
changes of the political parties since the 1980s handing 
over the choice of leader – and therefore Prime Minister 
(or Leader of the Opposition as Prime Minister-in-
waiting) – to an extra-parliamentary electorate of those 
paying a party subscription fee confuses these two systems, 
emphasising the negative elements of each. It dilutes 
parliamentary control of the executive, and provides an 
incomplete method of popular selection of the Head of 
Government. The time has come for Britain to enact a 
constitution that clearly provides that its Prime Minister 
is chosen from and by the membership of the House of 
Commons as expressed in confi dence motions, or else the 
offi ce and tenure of Prime Minister is to be removed from 
Parliament and its occupant chosen in a separate process 
by the whole electorate in quasi-presidential fashion.77
The events of 2016 have therefore exposed some 
fundamental fl aws in British political democracy, and 
strengthened the case for a written constitution. A 
documentary constitution would provide a coherent 
doctrine of political authority in the state, a declaration 
of principle on the position of the UK in the international 
community, a process for major political and constitutional 
change, and be the natural home for a home-grown Bill of 
Rights that set out the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
XI. A Prescription for a British Bill of Rights78
In other words, a Bill of Rights would be of great benefi t 
to the UK and its people, but its enactment should form 
part of a wide-ranging and comprehensive review of the 
country’s political and constitutional system. The precise 
nature, status and content of the document should be 
74  See Vernon Bogdanor, The Crisis of the Constitution 
(Constitution Society, 2015).
75  The House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform 
Committee conducted an inquiry on this subject in the 2010-15 
Parliament, for which the author served as Special Counsel: see 
A New Magna Carta?, HC (2014-15) 463; also Robert Blackburn, 
“Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom”, Statute 
Law Review (2015), pp. 1-27.
76  On constitutional legitimacy and referendums, see Stephen 
Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of 
Republican Deliberation (2012).
77  For discussion see Graham Allen MP, The Last Prime 
Minister: Being Honest About the UK Presidency (2002).
78  There have been a series of proposed blueprints on how 
a British Bill of Rights might be constructed, including John 
Macdonald QC, Bill of Rights (1969); Peter Wallington and 
Jeremy McBride, Civil Liberties and a Bill of Rights (1976); Joseph 
Jaconelli, Enacting a Bill of Rights: The Legal Problems (1980); 
Institute for Public Policy Research, A British Bill of Rights (1990); 
National Council for Civil Liberties, A People’s Charter (1991); 
Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK?, 
HL [2007-08] 165; Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of 
Rights? The Choice Before Us (2012); and ones as part of a draft 
Written Constitution including Tony Benn, Commonwealth of 
Britain Bill, HC [1990-91] 161; Richard Gordon, Repairing British 
Democracy: A Blueprint for Constitutional Change (2010); and 
Robert Blackburn, “Mapping the Path towards Codifying – or Not 
Codifying – the UK Constitution”, in House of Commons Political 
and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta?, 
HC (2014-15) 463.
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constructed in a manner that is compatible with those 
distinctive elements of traditional British constitutionalism 
that we wish to retain, but harmonise with other recent, 
present or imminent changes taking place across the 
political spectrum. Such a document would have a strong 
symbolic value as an expression of the rights and freedoms 
of all our citizens across the four nations of the UK, and 
become a key point of reference for individuals and 
groups in dealing with state agencies, and for politicians 
and public offi ce-holders in carrying out their work. Like 
the Human Rights Act at present, it would provide a legal 
remedy for individual grievances against public bodies but 
be more extensive in its scope, extending it expressly to 
private and commercial organisations. It would provide an 
opportunity to articulate the progressive values that our 
society and people seek to espouse, more closely attuned 
to our national circumstances than those drafted for the 
international purposes of the United Nations and Council 
of Europe.
The existing traditional and core civil liberties long 
recognised in Britain would be retained, refl ecting 
the emphasis the country’s culture has long placed on 
tolerance and free speech, absence of arbitrary offi cial 
conduct, fairness and due process in the application of the 
law, and equality of treatment. These principles should be 
prescribed by the Bill of Rights in a manner compatible 
with and complementary to our international obligations, 
notably the lowest common denominators set out in the 
Universal Declaration and ECHR. The real challenge for 
those drafting the Bill of Rights – and its most interesting 
intellectual aspect – will be to identify and articulate those 
further rights and freedoms which are, or shortly will be, 
of fundamental importance to the dignity and quality 
of human life. In order to express these principles, it is 
essential to focus on the problems and threats that lie 
ahead in the future. 
For example, two of the greatest threats to our freedoms, 
dignity, and quality of life, are posed by runaway new 
technologies and the potential for their misuse, and 
by environmental degradation. Coupled with this is 
the fact that those who govern and control our lives in 
both the state and commercial sectors are increasingly 
institutionally motivated by factors of administrative 
and fi nancial convenience. In some cases, human rights 
already recognised need considerable further articulation 
and adaptation in the UK. The fi eld of equality and non-
discrimination should extend its range to matters of 
genetic make-up. Freedom from degrading treatment 
should be elaborated on in diverse areas such as care of 
the elderly and surveillance of employees. The right to 
life should address issues of human cloning and voluntary 
euthanasia of the terminally ill. In other cases, new 
principles must be articulated, for example providing 
standards of environmental impact by which commercial 
and governmental bodies must operate. The precise 
drafting or wording of particular rights may fi nd lessons 
or models to follow from recent national and international 
bills of rights, including for example the enlightened South 
African Bill of Rights forged as part of its process of 
national reconciliation. 
In my view, the British Bill of Rights must not be a 
Bill of Rights and Duties or Responsibilities, as the last 
Labour government and Conservative proposals have 
suggested.79 It should not seek to instruct citizens by way 
of a list of state approved public responsibilities owed to 
society and the state. There are already responsibilities 
and obligations inherent in the concept of human rights, 
expressed for example in the provisos to many of the 
articles of the ECHR. These public interest factors 
are the other side of the same coin that stipulates our 
fundamental human rights and freedoms. The key 
question here is on what side of the coin do you wish 
to place the primary emphasis? In a free society the 
emphasis must be on the side of the rights and freedoms 
of the individual. If the government wants to promote 
ideas or obligations of civic responsibility and active 
citizenship, especially if they are to be compulsory ones, 
this must be done by way of some document or initiative 
other than through a new British Bill of Rights. Any 
government seeking to include such prescribed duties in 
a Bill of Rights would need to have its proposals very 
carefully scrutinised by the Joint Committee on Human 
Rights and other civil liberties watchdogs.
As an expression of the British state about its common 
values, any British Bill of Rights should uniformly bind 
the three legal systems operating in the UK (England and 
Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland) under the fi nal 
jurisdiction of the country’s Supreme Court. Statutory 
provisions should expressly state that the administrative 
and legislative measures of the devolved parliaments and 
assemblies must be compatible with the British Bill of 
Rights. Its content and way it is interpreted and applied 
should also take into account the UK’s international 
obligations: regardless of whether the UK leaves the 
European Union or changes in the status of the ECHR 
and rulings of the European Court of Human Rights in 
UK domestic law, such harmonisation of national with 
international treaties on human rights and democracy 
remains increasingly important as technological, social, 
fi nancial, commercial and environmental pressures drive 
the countries of the world closer together to address 
common problems and the need to avoid areas of potential 
confl ict.
A British Bill of Rights of a genuinely constitutional 
nature will need to address the balance of powers between 
executive, Parliament and judiciary, and establish its 
precise status and priority in law. As suggested above,80
in the writer’s view a scheme of semi-entrenchment 
similar to that of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms would be preferable. However, parliamentary 
sovereignty purists at Westminster are likely to baulk at 
any idea of entrenchment, though it might prove more 
acceptable if enacted as part of a written UK constitution. 
For this reason, at least initially, judicial review of primary 
legislation under the Bill of Rights might be confi ned to 
a non-legal declaration of incompatibility, similar to the 
scheme provided for in the Human Rights Act.81
A further complexity to disentangle will be to reach 
agreement on which human rights are capable of judicial 
enforcement from those that are not. Most jurists recognise 
that the freedoms and rights most capable of being 
actionable and enforceable through the courts are those of 
a civil and political nature, similar or closely associated to 
the type of rights in the European Convention. However, 
even if human rights relating to the workplace, housing, 
social security, health and the like are accepted as not being 
amenable to the legal process of judicial enforcement 
under a Bill of Rights, consideration should be given to 
drafting a statement of social and economic rights to serve 
as an authoritative declaration of principles on which 
government policy should be conducted. This declaration 
of social and economic rights could appear in a separate 
part of the Bill of Rights, making reference also to the 
79  See for example Ministry of Justice, Rights and Responsibilities: 
Developing our Constitutional Framework, Cm 7577 (2009); and 
comments by the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human 
Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK?, HC (2007-08) 150-1, chapter 8.
80  See p. 314.
81  S. 4.
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relevant international covenants and charters to which the 
UK is a treaty signatory, such as the Council of Europe 
Social Charter and the UN Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. The value of this declaration would 
therefore not lie in the realm of actionable legal remedies, 
but as a point of public and parliamentary reference and 
to assist in judicial interpretation of unclear statutory 
measures. It might also form part of the responsibilities 
of the Commission for Equality and Human Rights 
in preparing advisory reports on the compatibility of 
legislative and administrative developments with the social 
and economic principles expressed in the Bill.
On how a British Bill of Rights should be designed 
and prepared, it is of concern that particularly since 2001 
governments have taken upon themselves a forceful 
self-asserting role with respect to constitutional change, 
regularly driving such measures hastily through both 
Houses of Parliament under a three line whip.82 The truth is 
that governments of all persuasions have a vested interest 
in moulding our constitutional arrangements in a manner 
that suits their own political, fi nancial, and administrative 
convenience. This explains why some current opposition 
to a Bill of Rights comes from surprising quarters among 
the civil liberties lobby. For whilst in principle they may 
be enthusiastic supporters of a Bill of Rights, in practice 
they are worried the government will misuse its legislative 
power to construct a measure that actually facilitates 
draconian activities by the state, or removes the country’s 
commitment to the international protection of human 
rights.83 Nothing is more dangerous than corrosions of 
liberty dressed up as constitutional safeguards. For this 
reason, the draft legislative blueprint for a British Bill 
of Rights would be best drawn up by an independent 
committee of legal experts, one that commands the 
confi dence of the government and political parties 
represented in Parliament. This would be of a different 
nature to the Independent Commission on a Bill of Rights 
in 2011-12 whose composition of highly opinionated 
members across the political spectrum with wide terms 
of reference “to investigate the creation of a UK Bill of 
Rights” was virtually guaranteed not to co-operate or end 
with a strong consensus of recommendations.84 The key 
elements of the Bill to be drafted by a new Commission 
is best settled politically by the government in advance, 
leaving it to the Commissioners to exercise a legislative 
drafting exercise in similar manner to the Law Commission. 
Its recommendations and draft Bill of Rights should then 
be presented directly to Parliament.
XII. Conclusions
The proposal for a British Bill of Rights from the 
Conservative government will take time to be developed 
in its detail, and go through the necessary process 
of debate, scrutiny and approval in both Houses of 
Parliament. A preliminary green and/or white paper on 
the form of the proposed legislation is likely to produce 
a torrent of responses from politicians, lawyers, academics 
and the public during the consultation process conducted 
by the Justice ministry, and by the inquiries conducted 
by parliamentary committees involved.85 The new 
Justice Secretary, Elizabeth Truss, on 7th September this 
year confi rmed to the parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Human Rights that there will be a “very thorough 
consultation”.86
This article has sought to provide a better understanding 
of the Conservative proposals by analysing the shifting 
context, pressures and arguments in the debate on a 
British Bill of Rights as they have evolved over the past 
fi fty years. It is a debate that exposes some fundamental 
truths about the character of constitutional law in Britain 
today, particularly the unsatisfactory nature of its policy 
and reform making process, and the ambiguities in its 
theoretical underpinning. The UK has reached a critical 
stage in its constitutional development, and the solution to 
addressing many of its long-running problems – such as on 
the composition of the House of Lords, on an overarching 
framework for the union of England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, on placing the prerogative powers 
(including war powers) on a statutory basis, on expressing 
the country’s relationship with Europe and international 
community, and on regulating the constitutional law 
making process itself – is to confront and deal with them 
in combination. All this implies that the future of human 
rights reform in the UK would be best conducted through 
a genuinely constitutional Bill of Rights that formed part 
of a written codifi ed British constitution.87 
Author’s Note
This article was prepared in honour of the 70th birthday 
and retirement of Paul Mahoney as the UK Judge of the 
European Court of Human Rights. Its analysis covers a 
period of time in British political and constitutional life 
almost exactly the same as that of the career of Judge 
Mahoney himself, the greater part of which he devoted to 
extraordinary service at the Council of Europe and for the 
cause of universal human rights.
82  For a study of the current process of constitutional law reform 
in the UK, see Robert Blackburn, “Constitutional Amendment 
in the United Kingdom”, Ch. 18 in Xenophon Contiades (ed.), 
Engineering Constitutional Change: A Comparative Perspective on 
Europe, Canada and the USA (2012), pp. 359-388. See also House 
of Lords, The Process of Constitutional Change, HL (2010-12) 177.
83  See Philippe Sands and Helena Kennedy, “In Defence of 
Rights”, London Review of Books, 3 January 2013.
84  See Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK 
Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us, December 2012. As the 
Commission itself noted in its introduction, “It has been composed, 
and we must presume deliberately composed, of people who 
already had well defi ned views on the protection of human rights.” 
Acrimony in its early proceedings led one of the Commissioners, 
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, to resign. The remaining nine members 
of the Commission “all interpreted our terms of reference 
as treating the UK’s continuing adherence to the European 
Convention on Human Rights as a ‘given’” (p. 6): this was in line 
with the then Conservative Justice Secretary Kenneth Clarke QC 
(“There is not the faintest chance of the present Government 
withdrawing from the convention on human rights”, Commons 
Hansard, 13 September 2011, col. 880) and the then Conservative 
Attorney General Dominic Grieve QC (see Commons Hansard, 10 
February 2011, cols. 493 f.; also “Why Human Rights Should Matter 
to Conservatives”, Political Quarterly (2015), 62), which are at 
variance from those of the new Prime Minister, Theresa May (see 
above p. 319). A dissenting minority report by two Commissioners 
opposing a Bill of Right in existing circumstances was included in 
the published Report that otherwise supported the idea.
85  There are likely to include the Commons Justice Committee, 
the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the Lords Constitutional 
Committee, as well as (on the fi nal Bill itself) a Commons Public 
Bill Committee.
86  House of Commons Justice Committee, Oral evidence: 
The work of the Secretary of State, 7 September 2016, HC 
(2016-17) 620.
87  For discussion see Robert Blackburn, “Enacting a Written 
Constitution for the United Kingdom”, Statute Law Review (2015), 
pp. 1-27; and House of Commons Political and Constitutional 
Reform Committee, “A New Magna Carta?”, HC (2014-15) 463.
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